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Abstract 
This article argues that the politics and governance of migrants’ rights needs to be reframed. 
In particular, the terms “welfare chauvinism”, and deservingness should be replaced. Using a 
qualitative transnational case study of policymakers in Poland and the UK, we develop an 
alternative approach. In fine-grained and small-scale interpretive analysis, we tease out four 
distinct rationales of belonging that mark out the terms and practices of social membership, 
as well as relative positions of privilege and subordination. These rationales of belonging are: 
temporal-territorial, ethno-cultural, labourist, and welfareist. Importantly, these rationales 
are knitted together by different framings of the transnational contexts, within which the 
politics and governance of migration and social protection are given meaning. The rationales 
of belonging do not exist in isolation, but in each country, they qualify each other in ways that 
imply different politics and governance of migrants’ rights. Taken together, these rationales 
of belonging generate justifications for migrant inclusion that are stratified by class, gender 
and ethnicity as well as transnational projects of social exclusion. 
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The rights of migrants, and their access to social and economic resources, are decided at the 
complex junction between the politics and governance of migration, on the one hand, and the 
politics and governance of welfare, on the other. How migration is governed, and how 
migrants’ welfare is governed, are closely, but contingently, related (Ataç and Rosenberger 
2019; Mayblin 2019). At the same time, particular governing practices depend on, and are 
reproduced by, political discourse and meaning-making, that establish what can and should 
be governed, how and with what effects (Carmel, 2019). 
Two key concepts are generally used in social policy literatures to explore these relationships: 
‘welfare chauvinism’, and ‘deservingness’. In this article, we argue that neither concept 
provides an adequately refined tool for the untangling the politics of, and policies for, 
migrants’ social rights, and their normative contestation. Furhtermore, several recent 
qualitative studies show the complex assumptions and purposes that underpin expression of 
values measured in attitude surveys (cf. Keskinen 2016; Jørgensen and Petersen 2016). 
‘Welfare chauvinism’ is too ambiguous, and ‘deservingness’ is a binary concept, so cannot 
easily be operationalized to capture this complexity. Both concepts reproduce and reify 
methodologically nationalist assumptions about social rights and migration, rather than 
attending to the more complex transnational politics and governance of migration and social 
security in practice. 
Drawing on sociological theorising in migration studies, in this article, we are able to propose 
an alternative conceptual framework to explain the multi-dimensional assumptions, contexts 
and dynamics that shape the politics and governance of migrants and their social rights. 
Discussing the ‘politics of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis 2011); transnational citizenship and 
community (Faist 2000; Amelina 2019); and ‘communities of value’ (Anderson 2013), we can  
identify a range of reasonings about status, rights and membership that provide 
organisational logics to discriminate between those who belong, how far they belong, and 
under which conditions. Taken together, the literature indicates that these reasonings are 
organised around ethno-cultural, temporal-territorial, welfareist, labourist and transnational 
logics. We call these ‘rationales of belonging’. 
Empirically, the article explores these ideas of how migrants’ social rights are justified and 
regulated in practice. It presents a fine-grained, analysis of a small-scale transnational case 
study of elite British and Polish civil servants and experts. The empirical analysis was 
conducted abductively. Starting from an open-ended, inductively-framed interest in policy 
experts’ understandings of welfare regulations and EU migration, the analysis was elaborated 
step-wise by iteratively engaging with conceptual literatures to shed light on participants’ 
interpretations. (For clarity of narration, however, we present our discussion of the literatures 
first, before exploring how ‘rationales of belonging’ were reflected in our empirical case.) 
We closely examine the everyday, ‘taken-for-granted’ political articulation of social rights and 
EU mobility by those responsible for its governance. These elite policymakers articulated 
complex, multi-dimensional positions and justifications about the regulation of social security 
in general, and for migrants in particular (in our case, ‘free moving’ EU citizens). They did so 
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through implicit assumptions and explicit reasoning that reflected distinct, salient ‘rationales 
of belonging’. Their use of these rationales signalled distinctions between migrants and 
citizens and specific, limited and politicised social rights for migrants, as well as hierarchies 
among migrants. Participants explicitly articulated these rationales in the wider political 
economy and socio-geographical context of welfare, politics and migration in each country. 
We identified one dominant rationale (different in each country-case), that in each case was 
also nuanced by reference to two others. We also found that while participants in both Poland 
and the UK articulated ‘welfareist’ and ‘temporal-territorial’ rationales of belonging, these 
rationales were expressed differently in each country.  
From this inductive/abductive, qualitative analysis, we argue that ‘rationales of belonging’ is 
a valuable conceptual framework that can be developed and applied for further empirical 
research. We conclude with some reflections on its applicability for further exploration of 
attitudes and values of migrants and their relationship to welfare. 
2  Welfare chauvinism, deservingness, and belonging as alternative conceptualisations 
Welfare chauvinism  
‘Welfare chauvinism’ has commonly been used as a heuristic in studies of political attitudes 
to the social entitlements of migrants. Surprisingly, however, given its use in a range of 
studies, titles of books and articles, the concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’ is underspecified for 
this task.  
Goul-Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) coined the term almost in passing. They summarily 
defined it as the prioritisation of ‘looking after one’s own’, and their whole discussion about 
the term makes barely a page of text, that includes two tables (pp. 210-12). Their article 
sought to explain the sustainability and distinctiveness of far-right nativism and populist 
politics since the early 1970s in Denmark and Norway. ‘Welfare chauvinism’ was the key 
common characteristic, for which the authors cited attitudinal data showing nativist party 
supporters’ hostile attitudes towards aid to ‘developing countries’ (for Denmark) as 
equivalent to protectionist attitudes to provision of ‘welfare’ to ‘foreigners’ domestically (p. 
211) (for Norway). Specifically, these ‘welfare chauvinist’ attitudes were not about racism (p. 
212). They argued that this so, even though it is the common identification of ‘foreigners’ and 
‘developing countries’ with Blackness is indeed precisely what unites these attitudes, and also 
what distinguishes these nativist parties from their post-Nazi predecessors (see Kiskanen, 
2016, pp. 2-3). In its conceptual origins, then, ‘welfare chauvinism’ better described racist 
attitudes than anti-migrant ones.  
Recent studies have used welfare chauvinism as an organising idea or reference point for 
empirical studies. In doing so, they clearly show the variety of meanings that ‘welfare 
chauvinism’ can contain and conceal (Kiskanen 2016; Greve 2019, pp. 30-33). Migration 
research shows that the legal status of migrants directly affects the regulation of their rights 
and access to resources, including social rights, and how these are justified (cf Carmel and 
Paul 2013; Koopmans 2010). Yet ‘welfare chauvinism’ might refer to different groups of 
migrant (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016), or different categories of benefit with a range of 
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entitlement mechanisms, more or less relevant to migrants (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017; Jensen 
and Petersen, 2017). Furthermore, politics and governance of migrants’ status and rights, and 
attitudes towards them, are in practice racialised, classed and gendered (see Koostra 2016; 
Kremers 2016) in ways not captured by the generality and ambiguity of the concept. Kiskanen 
(2016) proposes the additional terms ‘welfare nationalism’ and ‘welfare exclusionism’ to 
identify non-racist political discourse, but these also bundle together a range of attitudes, 
rather than parsing out their component dimensions and diversity that is relevant to our 
purposes. They do not address questions of how attitudes intersect with policy and the 
regulation of social rights. 
Deservingness 
The other key conceptual tool for empirically explaining the politics of migrants social rights 
is ‘deservingness’. The distinctions between deserving/undeserving are produced in policy 
and in political discourse, benefit categories, organization of entitlements and conditionality 
(Clarke, 2005; Schneider and Ingram, 2005). Through policy and law, deservingness accords 
social legitimacy on benefit recipients and on categories of behaviour (Mau and Mewes 2013; 
Svallfors, 2014; van Oorschot et al, 2017). However, as Koostra (2016, p. 326-8) shows, 
discussing deservingness of migrants in relation to access to social benefits or rights makes a 
category error. Surveys that ask whether migrants deserve benefits de facto ask about the 
legal personhood of the status ‘migrant’, and the moral economy of belonging that is 
associated with that mobility, rather than the moral economy of deservingness on the basis 
of behaviour.  
Attitudes towards migrants’ claims are based on emotional and ideologically-framed feelings 
of identification, value, assumptions about ‘ways of being’ and the worth of their status as 
migrants, not as people claiming social rights (Carmel and Cerami 2011; Osipovič, 2015). 
Public discourse and governance selectively privileges the rights of particular kinds of worker-
migrant, or asylum-seeker, who might fit different deservingness criteria more or less well, 
not because of their behaviour or entitlements, but because of their legal categorization or 
ethnic identity (Koostra, 2016, esp. pp. 330-2; Sainsbury, 2012; Mayblin 2019). Recognition of 
migrants’ rights can be – and in practice often is – articulated in intricate webs of overlapping 
policies, conditions, and justifications that generate complex forms of stratification and access 
to rights (Carmel and Paul 2013; also Bruzelius, 2019; Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017). Its 
expression in both political discourse and policy is classed, gendered and ethnicised (cf Shutes 
and Walker 2018; Amelina and Lutz 2019).  As such, ‘deservingness’ disguises the complexity 
of the intersecting moral economies of welfare and migration in politics and governance. This 
complexity cannot be captured in binary deserving/non-deserving categorisations. 
Belonging 
Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias elaborated a distinctive political sociology of migration, 
showing how intersecting institutions, ‘organised around the intentionality of control with a 
given apparatus of enforcement’, are used to determine those who belong, and, most 
importantly, on what conditions (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989 p.6). Their approach 
accommodates both the governance of rights and the political discourses that sustain them. 
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In this section we examine their work alongside further conceptual elaborations that explore 
the place of welfare, work and transnationalism in the political sociology of migration. In 
synthesis, we identify the conceptual outlines of five ‘rationales of belonging’ that underpin 
political discourse, action and governance of migrants and migration.  
Ethno-cultural:  The governance of migration and the rights of migrants has long been tied to 
claims of ethno-cultural homogeneity, particularly, but not only, in societies that frame 
themselves as destination countries, or ‘countries of immigration’. Ethno-cultural belonging 
rests on collective imaginaries to create shared emotional attachments to, and claims on, ‘the 
nation’ (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 2010). It assumes a durable production and protection of 
national identity as a feeling of belonging (Guibernau, 1996, 2007; Özkirimli, 2010), and in 
‘countries of emigration’, diaspora communities can play an important role (Lavie, 1996). In 
Europe, ethno-cultural belonging implicitly or explicitly constituted through Whiteness has 
been central to the organisation and management of migration (Bhambra 2015; de Genova 
2015). Women have historically played a special role in the reproduction of this notional 
nation biologically, culturally and symbolically (Yuval-Davis, 1996), as reflected in social norms 
and legislation relating to sexual relationships, sexuality and procreation. Ethno-culturally and 
racially pure women become responsible for the purity of the nation’s blood which should not 
be contaminated (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 2005) and ethno-cultural politics of belonging is 
usually associated with ius sanguinis citizenship regulation.  
Temporal-territorial: The national state is existentially territorial, that is, it has a distinctively 
spatial dimension, even if the boundaries of that territory are frequently contested, 
challenged, or just indeterminate through colonial projects (Hansen and Jonson 2014; Carmel 
2019). Seen as homeland (Yuval-Davis, 1997), rights to be present in a physical space are 
subject to temporal-territorial politics of belonging, a ‘racialisation of exclusion and 
inferiorization that are the outcome of the relative new presence of particular people and 
collectives in particular places […]’ (Yuval Davis 2011 p.99; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 2005). 
Temporal-territorial belonging can sanction the political claims of indigenous peoples for 
emancipation, but historically it has been more often used to occlude the violence of settler 
colonialism, and it can undermine claims for diasporic belonging that are marked by territorial 
absence. Regulation of migrants social, political and civil rights have strong temporal 
dimensions (Griffiths, 2016) and temporal-territorial belonging is usually associated with ius 
solis citizenship regulations. This rationale highlights the fundamental importance of ‘rights to 
reside’ and the temporal regulation of migrants’ rights status and membership (Bruzelius 
2018; anonymised) neither of which are accessible with concepts of welfare chauvinism or 
deservingness, even though they figure significantly in public attitudes (cf Greve 2019, pp. 
142-5).  
Welfareist: The association of ethno-cultural nationhood with sexual and social reproduction 
is also integral to the gendered (and in some cases, eugenicist) foundations of national welfare 
states. These define the terms of social resource entitlement through the regulation of norms, 
social categorisations and behavioural conditions. In doing so, they establish terms, conditions 
and degrees of belonging, regulate ‘problematic populations’, and stratify, discipline and 
reward privileged social groups and preferred behaviours (Runfors and Fröhlig 2019). Ennser-
Jedenastik (2017) shows that there may be ideas and attitudes to deservingness that are 
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shaped by the characteristics of benefit conditionality (e.g. via need or contributions). 
However, welfare systems by themselves do not map onto the attitudes or ‘policy imaginary’ 
(Mayblin 2016) of migration governance, or designate legitimate entitlement, because 
entitlement for migrants is always tied up with the categorisation of their a priori legal status: 
as a high skill, temporary, family dependant, or refugee migrant, for example. Welfareist 
rationales belonging therefore ‘cuts across’ the acceptability of behaviours of migrants (the 
idea of ‘deservingness’), and is used to directly govern migrants’ migration, as much as their 
claims to welfare (Ataç and Rosenberger, 2019; Mayblin, 2019).  
Labourist: Bridget Anderson (2013) shows that defining migrants as non-citizens, and the 
indigent and unemployed as failed citizens, also conjointly serves to create the boundaries of 
a (national) ‘community of value’. The internal ordering of social belonging that valorises 
‘work’ can merge into social belonging for ‘workers’. This labourist rationale then relies on 
definitions and assumptions about who or what is a worker, or how particular forms of work 
count towards belonging (e.g. some work is only suitable or men or women; or perhaps 
‘employment’ is an activity for masculine belonging) (Soysal 2012). The labourist rationale of 
belonging can be related to welfareist belonging, but need not be. The non-worker migrant 
and the non-worker citizen may share classed, ethnicised and gendered characteristics that 
are stigmatised, Other, unentitled (Bauman, 2011).  
Transnational: This rationale of belonging counters the methodologically nationalist 
assumptions in ‘deservingness’ and ‘welfare chauvinism’ conceptual frames. Belonging is not 
always experienced, regulated, or understood, in statist or national frames. Studies of 
belonging indicate that migrants themselves engage in practices and have experiences and 
attachments that exist simultaneously across spatial and institutional boundaries: they are 
trans-local and transnational (Glick Schiller et al, 1992). Analogously, a transnational rationale 
of belonging supports the governance of migrants’ rights, conceived and practiced across and 
between geographic and state boundaries, not through demarcations of ethno-cultural 
homogeneity or spatial proximity. There are global and regional institutions that establish 
social norms and legal rules on rights that transcend particular residence, citizenship or ethno-
cultural identification (Soysal 2012; Faist 2009, 2014). Typically these include transnationally 
regulated rights to express family ties; earn and access benefit entitlements; not be double-
taxed; secure long-term circular mobility across boundaries. In practice, transnational 
rationales of belonging overlap and can contradict those to which migrants are subject in 
different places simultaneously (Shaw and Miller, 2013; anonymised citation). Governing 
transnational belonging in practice can produce contingent and indeterminate rules of who 
belongs where, what Anna Amelina (2016) calls ‘regimes of intersection’; gendered, classed 
and ethnicised inequalities shaping the form and limits of transnationalism.  
These rationales of belonging are contingent and interlocking, and the synthesis presented 
here is unlikely to offer a globally exhaustive list. And of course, the supposedly territorially 
and ethnically coherent ‘national’ welfare states of Europe have always used discontinuous 
territorial, racial and ethnic boundaries to subjugate the belonging of colonized peoples, and 
those of ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic minorities. Values and attitudes towards the 
status, membership and rights of migrants and citizens are unlikely to generate only binary 
divisions. These conceptual discussions of belonging suggest that specific combinations of 
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rationales are brought to bear to politically justify who has rights, when, where and under 
what conditions in particular cases. Before we turn to our empirical analysis, however, we first 
explain our research context and methodology. 
3 Research context, design and methodology 
Intra-EU migration is a good test case to explore how transnational social rights of migrant 
workers are established, protected or limited. From 2004-2013, reforms to the European 
Union Treaty and Regulations seemed to usher in a constitutionalised and normatively agreed, 
transnational right to mobility, that was also seen as an essential tool in promoting the EU’s 
economic growth. The Union could be, and was, seen as a geo-economic, socio-political and 
institutional space in which EU citizens derived rights as legally constituted ‘citizens’. Since 
then, however, politics and policy have shifted. Our empirical exploration examines the 
reasonings of policymakers at a key political turning point. 
Our empirical interest was in the framing and rationales for the social security rights of 
migrants, rather than the practice of regulations and their implementation (which would have 
warranted interviews with, or observations of, ground-level decisionmakers). As such, we 
sought participants for their senior professional role, and experience of working in this 
transnational EU space, while also acting as ‘translators’ (Clarke et al 2015) of policy rationales 
into national policymaking. Between December 2014 and May 2015, we conducted 12 one-to 
one elite interviews with national policy stakeholders in the UK (seven interviews) and Poland 
(five interviews), who were working in the field of EU social security co-ordination. The 
interviews were conducted as part of a wider project across eight EU member states, that also 
involved regulatory analysis, survey and migrant interviews (Amelina et al, 2019). For the 
wider project, participants in a further six EU member states were selected and interviewed 
(by other researchers) on the same basis (detailed discussion in Runfors and Fröhlig 2019).1 
We do not refer to these interviews in the remainder of the paper. 
Our participants were all active in national and EU policymaking at a senior national and 
European level. Most were senior civil servants from relevant ministries (e.g. health, family, 
social security) as well as public social security lawyers and academics with an official policy 
advisory role (e.g. on ministerial or EU expert committees). A number of interviewees were 
also, or had been, their national representative on EU committee of member states 
responsible for designing regulations of social security in the European Union, and for offering 
national expert advice on implementation in their national context. One participant in the UK 
and one in Poland also had explicitly ideological roles, involved in politics and/or political 
campaigning, rather than only in policymaking. Most EU member states have only one 
national team in each ministry (sometimes only one team overall) negotiating with the EU on 
these issues. In the EU itself, social security co-ordination is considered a highly specialist 
‘technical’ field, and this constitutes a small, expert and elite population with very limited 
heterogeneity. As such, the participants in the study constitute a relevant and, despite the 
small overall numbers, appropriate, purposive ‘criterion’ sample (Bryman 2016)2 to explore 
the rationales and reasoning that underpin particular social security regulations and their 
translation between EU and member state and between member states. 
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The interviews were inductively oriented towards exploring participants’ general 
interpretations, experiences and understandings of EU regulation of social security rights of 
free movers and its intersection with their national context. The topic guide used widely-
framed, open-ended questions to explore participants’ understandings of their national 
welfare system, and the social security rights of migrants as well as the role of the EU (see 
appendix 1). The topic guide was designed by Emma Carmel, with Ann Runfors, in English, and 
translated into Polish by Bożena Sojka. Interviews referred to in this paper were conducted in 
English and Polish respectively, by the authors, and lasted between 40 minutes to 1.5 hours. 
The analysis was conducted in each language by a native speaker, to ensure that specific 
meanings and nuance could be properly explored, and the Polish interview excerpts 
translated at a late stage in the analysis (cf Carmel 1999). 
We performed qualitative thematic analysis of interviews, using open coding, creating 
categories for each language-set of interviews. In the open-coding phase, we attended 
particularly to the discursive framings, terminology and forms of argumentation adopted by 
our participants when they reflected on the characteristics, origins and development of free 
movement and social security co-ordination, the EU as a whole, its policy and law-making. 
This coding process was followed by comparison and coding across the English and Polish 
interviews to identify common framings and key vectors of difference among all participants.3 
It was in the process of comparison in particular, that we were able to inductively identify 
specific forms of reasoning that participants used when interpreting their national regulation 
of EU migrants’ social security rights, access and entitlements. We then iteratively explored 
alternative conceptualisations of these ways of reasoning with reference to social policy and 
migration literatures described above. In this article, we focus on explaining the distinct, 
substantive lines of reasoning, and framings of policy issues, that we identified among 
participants. 
The timing of political events was important. The Polish parliamentary election in 2015 meant 
that gaining access to Polish participants became very difficult. When the interviews were 
conducted, the new government had introduced a major family benefit reform, which 
featured prominently in interviews.  Our first UK interviews were conducted during Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s negotiation with the EU in 2014-15. This period also saw 14 
amendments to UK social security and welfare regulations for EU migrants. In our first five UK 
interviews, participants focused on the negotiation agenda of the Cameron government, and 
in the last two, “Brexit” featured strongly. In this febrile atmosphere it is very likely that, had 
we interviewed politicians and political advocates, we might have identified more marked 
discursive lines of difference among participants. As predominantly elite policy/legal 
professionals, our participants were articulate, extremely knowledgeable and politically self-
aware. Given that only two of the participants had a specifically ideological stance, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the others presented themselves, their professional role and their 
discourse as ‘technical’; as regulatorily, legally and politically neutral. This is not to say, 
however, that politics was absent from the interview discussions. Indeed, the self-conscious 
positioning of these policy, regulation and legal professionals as moderate and/or non-
political, generated insights into what attributes of free movement, social security rights of 
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EU migrants, and their regulation, constituted unspoken assumptions, distinct from those 
aspects available for contestation and debate.  
The remainder of the article explains our findings for each national case, before discussing our 
transnational findings and their implications for the development of a new conceptual 
framework.  
4 Rationales of belonging and position in Polish policy expert narratives  
Transnational context: Poland in the European Union 
Our interviewees’ narratives positioned emigration as an inevitable, quasi-natural 
phenomenon that emerged directly from Poland’s status as an EU member state in which the 
economic hierarchies of member statehood are inevitable; not available for political control 
or government (cf Sojka and Saar, 2019).  
This [post 2004 migration] was a consequence of peoples’ rational decisions... 
…So, if we are joining the EU, and this is linked with free mobility of workers, so 
they make their decisions. [National advisory committee (NAC) member (2)] 
Given this individual and rational choice, the country of origin is not responsible for migrants’ 
social security, rights, or belonging. At the height of politicisation of the European Union’s 
‘refugee crisis’, Poland was positioned as a country of emigration, with consequent 
demographic problems, and, as an economically developing EU member state of inward 
migration, with a need to ‘have control over the number of [Belarussian] Gastarbeiters’ [NAC 
member (1)]. This framing of the transnational political economy and regulatory context 
enabled our policy experts to navigate three entangled rationales of belonging and establish 
hierarchies in the rights of citizens, ‘migrants’ and returnees.  
Ethno-cultural rationale  
The dominant rationale of belonging expressed among our interviews in Poland was ethno-
cultural. While distancing themselves, as rational and elite policy experts, from discourses that 
viewed emigrants as ‘traitors’, this ‘most extreme’ position was central to the political context 
within which they worked. Participants articulated a highly-developed but apparently 
moderate or reasonable, rationale of ethno-cultural belonging.  
In this semi-distancing articulation, emigrants were Polish nationals who did not belong, 
because they did not fulfil their duties as Polish citizens in Poland. Polish emigrants are unable 
to reproduce the ethno-nation and consequently pass on cultural values. These reasonings 
co-existed with an expressed utilitarian need for immigration, of particular preferred kind, as 
a response to aging society, mentioned by all participants and typically expressed in the 
excerpts below.  
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…mainly young people of reproductive age emigrate, which deepens the 
demographic problem in our country. People who could improve this situation 
have kids abroad. [EU Committee member] 
[T]he good characteristic of immigration is that Ukrainians are relatively close to us in 
terms of, and here I will use all politically incorrect wordings: race, faith, religion.. [NAC 
member (1)] 
Now Ukrainians are cheap labour in Poland, because also in Poland, lets not deny it we 
need workers […] and they are unproblematic as they are like us. [Government official 
(1)] 
Migration from Ukraine is not a problem at all. We are like brothers [Government 
official (2)] 
In this context, and as expected from the literature, this ethno-cultural rationale was strongly 
gendered. On the one hand, Ukrainian immigrants are workers, men, brothers. On the other 
hand, women Polish emigrants are perceived as problematic. They are unable to reproduce 
the ‘nation’ and pass on the necessary ethno-cultural values.  
Polish women prefer to have children abroad... But this is huge loss for Poland 
and for future of Poland. These children will not have Polish roots, Polish culture, 
and will most probably never be back, so they are lost for us. [NAC member (1)] 
Ethno-cultural belonging is both presumed, and responsibility for nationhood is 
conventionally assigned to mothers. However, it is also not presented as being only a matter 
of ethnic ‘Polish’ identification: it also concerns presence in Poland. 
Temporal-territorial rationale 
Family and nation were closely tied, but discussion of children and returnees also highlighted 
a strong territorial dimension to migrants’ belonging, rights and social security. 
Heternormative, married couples with children – ‘the family’ – were the fundamental unit of 
nation, reflecting strong traditions of Social Catholicism. But according to the temporal-
territorial rationale, Polish migrant children, especially those born abroad, would not return 
to Poland as ethno-nationally ‘Polish’. Weakening family ties associated with emigration are 
a cause of ‘Euro-orphanhood’ and ‘multiple pathologies’ [Expert EU Committee member], of 
‘broken families, or issues related to demography and so on’ [National advisory committee 
member (1)]. 
It was not that presence in Poland was required, but rather that the longer you are away, the 
less you belong. In the transnational context of EU social security regulation and migration 
patterns, Poles resident in another EU member state were not Polish, and so not responsibility 
of the Polish national state. Discussing UK policies to check rights of residence of migrants 
who were turning 16, one participant said:  
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How could they suddenly be denied a right to reside? They don’t have anything 
to do with Poland. … they do not have roots in Poland anymore… if the whole 
family lives in the UK and they do not have any ties with Poland, then they are 
under British jurisdiction […].  [Government official (1)] 
The same interviewee also explained how the regulatory assessment of temporal-territorial 
belonging discriminated between the ‘genuine’/non-genuine Polish resident, where 
genuineness was determined by physical, territorial presence:  
…resident registration is not the same as residency. So, for example people have been 
in the UK for the last couple of years, but are still registered in Poland. So here we 
will introduce the verification of their actual residency….because resident 
registration is often a sort of tie with Poland, but it is just an administrative tie. 
[Government official (1)] 
Presence, however, was also sometimes not enough, as interviewees discussed behavioural, 
welfareist conditions to belonging, which also mediated the dominant ethno-cultural 
rationale. 
Welfareist rationale 
Our interviewees expressed classed and ethnicised hierarchies of migrant returnees, inferring 
an apparently obvious likelihood that returnees to Poland would be engaged in ‘benefit 
tourism’. Preferred returnees would be successful, self-sufficient entrepreneurial individuals 
who do not pose a burden on the Polish social security system:   
..well for example, if they set up some type of business here, and they will be 
self-employed, if they have money, yes, then they will be covered by insurance. 
Of course others can try to register as unemployed […]. I don’t think returnees 
have problems here, unless they create them themselves. [Government official 
(2)] 
The naturalised context of emigration as an economically rational individual decision meant 
that decisions to return were equally seen as an individual responsibility for personal success 
or failure. Re-incorporation into the Polish social security system is seen as unproblematic for 
those with savings and/or entrepreneurs who belong through their re-incorporation in the 
local labour market. This also subtly positions Poland as a European country, structurally 
embedded in transnational systems of social stratification where it is undesirable to rely on 
welfare state. Mediating the temporal-territorial rationale of belonging, the longer a migrant 
was absent from the Polish labour market, the less (s)he belonged to it. “Benefit tourism” 
arguments were used to denigrate and discursively exclude returning nationals. 
…from research we can see that employers do not value returnees too much. 
…Often returnees are described as: oh you came back, so maybe you failed, why 
did you come back? [NAC member (2)] 
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I mean they might be a problem. Why? The Polish health system isn’t a universal 
health insurance….It’s not based on Polish citizenship, …it is not enough to be 
Polish to be insured. [Government official (2)]  
Discussion of the new family benefit, 500+, a categorical benefit associated with pro-natalist, 
heteronormative social Catholic norms, was also marked by strongly welfareist attitudes that 
were directly articulated with the dominant rationale of ethno-cultural belonging. Its 
introduction was viewed as a potential tool to reduce emigration: 
…if someone has two or three kids then this benefit starts to be comparable with the 
British one, and the cost of living in Poland is lower. So I don’t think this will make 
people return, but it might prevent some form of migration. [Government official (1)] 
Overall, shared cultural values and (particular preferred kinds of) family ties provided a basis 
for ethno-cultural belonging expressed by our participants, but this dominant rationale was 
qualified by the importance of being physically resident in Poland. According the temporal-
territorial rationale, absence in particular diminished family ties, and challenged belonging to 
the nation. Yet, even temporal-territorial rationales were qualified by welfareism, once 
questions of access to resources were raised. 
5  Rationales of belonging and position: politicising rights and EU mobility in the UK 
Transnational context 
The UK participants articulated a political regulatory context marking out British 
exceptionalism compared to other EU member states (also Runfors and Fröhlig 2019). One 
expert explained the dynamics in relevant EU meetings:  
… [other Member States] sit there looking at the UK as a kind of voice of Europe 
… and you know everyone is really keen for the UK to get involved …hmmm [we] 
bring a lot to the table.  
[technical expert from Ministry A]. 
The UK was represented as a leader – ‘ahead’ with welfare reforms; a ‘driver’, ‘at the cutting 
edge’ [ministry technical expert (1)], where other member states ‘have an interest in what the 
UK is doing’ [Government official (1)]. Other member states are thus ‘behind’ in a 
temporalized hierarchy of member statehood. While a focus on ‘the big issues’ positioned 
Britain as significant as and politically capable, ‘we are often a bit of a trouble maker’ [Ministry 
technical expert (1)]. This positioning was linked to naturalized differences among EU social 
security systems in which the UK was a special place with a unique welfare system (sometimes 
described inaccurately):   
it isn't the most open in terms of eligibility and the fact that it's not tied to 
contributions in any meaningful way makes it unique. [Think tank director] 
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…all our benefits are residency based, and …. the [EU] Regulation started off in 
six countries as an insurance-based scheme. The way in which coordination 
works it doesn’t necessarily fit with the UK benefits regime. [Government official 
2] 
Narratives of uniqueness were articulated with accounts of the changing nature of the EU. All 
interviewees talked about the EU as a valuable political project, that sometimes verged on 
transnational rationale of belonging – for example, contributing to ‘pan-European culture’ and 
‘the enhancement of our quality of life’ [Advisor to ministry X]. Yet the situation for the UK 
was problematic due to enhanced mobility and changes in the Union itself. In contrast, intra-
EU migration post-2004, was seen as contributing to the increasingly complex and 
unmanageable coordination of social security rights, an idea also used to challenge the EU as 
a political project. 
Welfareist rationales 
Across their accounts, participants reproduced a wider political narrative around ‘welfare 
reform’. The prominence given to ‘welfare reform’ signalled the UK’s uniqueness, being 
‘ahead’; essentialised as a country of ‘principles’. ‘Fairness’ was the key principle that justified 
welfare reforms, and ‘fairness’ was a crucial condition for determining belonging (not only in 
the UK: Runfors and Fröhlig 2019). Discussing the benefit restrictions introduced in 2014-15, 
one participant declared: 
I’m assuming all these measures save money, probably millions, but being in the UK, 
I think the public likes fairness and principle, and that’s probably the primary driver. 
[Ministry technical expert (1)] 
Another participant observed that ‘I don’t think that there is an accurate assessment of how 
much money is being saved’ [NAC member]. Yet even if social security expenditure on EU 
migrants is relatively insignificant, it raised questions of fairness for hard-pressed British 
citizens, given the entitlements of EU citizens.  
[…] like with everything in the UK, it is a lot of…you know like people caring about 
the principles […] it is about what’s right, especially when we are in austerity. 
[Government official (2)] 
 
It's not just a kind of matter of money it's a matter of kind of principle and 
citizenship, or else then I’d say the system is broken. [Think tank director]  
These elite policy experts did not engage directly with benefit tourism arguments; they were 
aware that there is little evidence of the ‘undeservingness’ of EU migrants as ‘benefit tourists’. 
As in Poland, our participants deliberately referred to more ‘extreme’ but important political 
reference points to legitimize the reasonableness of their position. What, and under what 
conditions, migrants deserve in social security was re-framed as determined by this 
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incontestable but elusive quality of “fairness”, expressed as a question of the relationship 
between migrants and citizens.  
the majority of that [migration] comes from the EU because we no longer take 
low skilled migrants from elsewhere pretty much. And I think there is an issue 
around fairness which is again access to social security […] [Think tank director] 
Well it would mean that we would have to pay people with their right to residence, 
child benefit and child tax credit. So yes and I don’t think this would make a very good 
Daily Mail4 article [laughing]. [Government official (1)] 
 
This welfareist rationale of belonging established a moral economy where being fair, rather 
than equitable, solidaristic, or deserving is the principle of welfare and social organization 
(also between EU member states; Runfors and Fröhlig 2019). Being ‘fair’ marked the outer 
limit of what can be done for those who do (and do not) belong. ‘Fairness’ expressed and 
justified the intensification of conditionality, and the non-provision of welfare. To have a need 
or entitlement to welfare was itself an indicator of not-belonging.   
Labourist rationale 
Trying to secure the need for an appropriately skilled and willing workforce within the 
UK economy from wherever those workers come sits awkwardly with a political 
discourse which says foreign workers are taking British jobs, foreign workers are 
taking social security benefits to which they should not be entitled…..[NAC member]  
In the labourist rationale of belonging in the UK, work appeared as the most important marker 
of difference between those who have rights and those who do not. Yet the distinction 
between ‘British’ and ‘European’ workers acted as a supplementary ethnicised marker of 
degrees of belonging, to nuance and qualify the welfareist rationale focused on migrants. This 
rationale reproduced classed assumptions about work and welfare in the UK that positioned 
the unemployed and migrants as not exactly equivalent non-citizens (Soysal 2012, Anderson, 
2013). Our participants understood that EU migrants do not disproportionately claim any 
benefits, including unemployment benefits: ‘we have only few thousand people [claiming 
benefit] but we have probably 10 times this money being brought in. …. I guess it’s important 
that most people are coming to work.’ [Ministry technical expert (1)].  
However, migrants were importantly stereotyped as workers taking low-skilled ‘natives’’ jobs. 
This was in part a straightforward labour-protectionist argument, where (ethnicised, gendered 
and classed) ‘native’ workers need jobs: migrants are seen as posing a threat by undercutting 
wages, by working too hard, or just being too numerous. This finding reflects wider discussion 
on selectivity for skill in migration governance, with quasi-magical qualities ascribed to high-
paid work, and classed and gendered values about which jobs should provide a pathway to 




There are also debates around that there are a lot of people coming across, highly 
skilled people doing low skilled work in the United Kingdom, and that affects the 
targeted support [for British unemployed]. […] [Government official (2)]  
The presence and rights of employed EU migrants were further problematized when 
combined with the welfareist rationale. When migrants undertake low-skill and low-paid 
employment, the ‘failed citizen’ [British unemployed] (Anderson, 2013) is inappropriately 
shielded from the state’s project of ‘targeting’ support in order to change their problematic 
behaviour (being unemployed). The ‘hard-working’ EU migrants who perform to the labourist 
rationale of belonging, were problematic because they were doing the wrong kinds of (low 
skill, low paid) employment, and so facilitating ‘welfare dependency’ of the ‘British’ 
unemployed. Combining welfareist and labourist rationales meant that EU free movers are 
accused of both ‘stealing jobs’ and also of abusing welfare system by claiming benefits.  
Temporal-territorial rationale 
The politics of temporal-territorial belonging were central to arguments for ending free 
movement, many of the social security regulation reforms in 2014-15, and negotiations to and 
determine the ‘best’ arrangements for rights and privileges of EU migrants in the UK.  
 
EU regulations permit a three-month moratorium on free movers’ access to non-contributory 
welfare benefits and services (housing benefit, child benefit). Before the 2014 reforms, this 
possibility had not been invoked in the UK. ‘[W]e don’t have many people taking 
unemployment benefit out, so using that three months’ [Government official] moratorium did 
not save money (as per welfareist rationale) or incentivise contributory employment (as per 
labourist rationale). Yet in the contentious context of pre-referendum politics, the temporal-
territorial rationale provided an opening for negotiation in the wider EU. So, welfareist 
rationales of belonging became significantly qualified by territorial belonging; working is not 
enough, working over time was important. 
 
However we think there has to be kind of a close tie between nationality and access 
to the national public purse, because of where the money comes from. [Think tank 
director] 
 
This rationale was expressed most directly in discussions of child benefit, perceived as 
particularly problematic.5 Even when participants dismissed or denigrated arguments that 
dominated public/media discourse, the need to be ‘here’ was important than familial 
relationships with the hard-working EU migrant who otherwise had entitlement to child 
benefit. The child (living abroad) did not have the residential relationship of belonging that 
would entitle them – or rather their UK-resident parents – to benefit.  This was, as ever, linked 
to the dominant rationale of welfareism and ‘fairness’, concerned with the higher value of this 




these children are much better off living in another member state receiving huge 
amount of support from the United Kingdom [sarcastic laugh]. [Government official 
(1)] 
so I guess lots of Polish plumbers to be stereotypical getting child benefit for their 
children back in Poland…and then suddenly it becomes …this is now like a 
Conservative party manifesto commitment. […] [Ministry technical expert (1)] 
 
Discussion  
Across our two cases, we identified four rationales of belonging – ethno-cultural, temporal-
territorial, welfareist and labourist -  two of which were used in both country cases. These 
rationales were used implicitly or explicitly to scaffold argumentation for the exclusion of 
specific categories of migrant from accessing benefits (e.g. returning national citizens who had 
grown up elsewhere), for the hierarchical privileging of social rights for some EU migrants over 
others. 
Highly relevant to wider literature on attitudes and deservingness, is our finding that 
rationales of belonging were made sense of by reference to their positioning in the wider 
political economy of migration in the EU (also Paul 2014). For example, Poland’s experts 
articulated this rationale in negative terms, where (un)belonging was marked by length of 
absence, as a self-identified country of emigration. In the UK, this rationale was articulated by 
participants in positive terms, belonging was marked by length of presence in the UK, as a self-
identified country of immigration.  Table one summarises our empirical findings from across 
our interviews. 
The four rationales of belonging expressed by our participants– were woven together by 
participants to create distinctive vectors along which it was assumed that migrants should be 
able to secure belonging, rights and social protection as they move between countries. In each 
of our cases, there were distinct dominant shared rationale, mediated by two others. So, in 
the UK case, the dominant welfareist rationale was qualified by requirements for territorial-
temporal belonging of migrants, and ethno-national rationales of belonging are subordinate 
to classed markers of belonging (welfareism). In case of our Polish participants, the dominant 
rationale for identifying those who have social membership, was ethno-cultural, but this is 
mediated by gender, temporal-territorial absence, and classed welfareism. We did not find an 
expression of a transnational rationale of belonging in either case. This is perhaps 
unsurprising, given the national policy positions held by our participants. It is probable that 
transnational rationales are more likely to be found among those circulating particular party 






Table 1: Comparing rationales of belonging among policy experts in Poland and the UK 
 UK stakeholders Poland stakeholders 
Transnational 
context 
Superordinate status.  
 
Country of immigration. 
 
Interpellated status.  
 




 Welfareist  
 
Ethnicised protection of welfare and 
public service resources. 
Ethno-cultural  
 
Gendered expectation of ethno-national 





Positive: presence over time leads to 




Classed and ethnicised performative 




Negative: absence over time leads to loss 




Ethnicised and gendered provision for 
‘one’s own’, based on performative 
economic success for belonging on return. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored how the ‘intentionality of control’ (Anthias and Yuval Davis, 
1989) in the politics of belonging can be organized, reasoned and expressed to generate 
specific political rationales of belonging for migrants, and in doing so, articulates their rights, 
and their limits. So what of our wider contention on the value of using rationales of belonging 
as a new conceptual framework? We venture the following conclusions.  
The framework of ‘rationales of belonging’ is promising because it is simple, clear, and flexible, 
but not naïve or ambiguous. It (so far) suggests a number of possible rationales, and our small 
study shows that rationales can be combined in different forms. Our analysis indicates that 
political and regulatory distinctions are shaped by the presumed social group, migration 
biography, legal status, and benefit category of the claimant. The construction of ethnic, 
gendered, and classed hierarchies is produced by the articulation of specific rationales of 
belonging with direct reference to the wider purposes of policy. Rationales of belonging are 
not just exclusionary (cf ‘deservingness’): they are selective and positional. A ‘rationales of 
belonging’ framework can explicitly address questions of racism and xenophobia and how 
they are hidden within, or used to re-work, related but separate ideas of membership, 
belonging and rights.  
Furthermore, our framework enabled us to show that there are rationales that are expressed 
in different places simultaneously, but that negate, rather than promote, transnational 
belonging. Indeed, these shared rationales can transnationally exclude migrants from 
entitlement in twice-over, and that some migrants are more likely to face this than others 
(anonymised citation). In our empirical example, this combination of welfareist and temporal-
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territorial rationales shared in Poland and the UK, expresses an underlying rejection of the 
ordinariness of migrants’ lives. For migrants, ordinary contingent biography - divorce, death, 
accident, debts, and ill-health – does not trigger access to entitlement and resources. Instead, 
facing regulations organised around exclusionary rationales of belonging in places of origin 
and destination, such ordinary events trigger disentitlement to resources, including work, 
housing, health, education and care; even residence itself. The effect, translated into 
regulation, of these shared exclusionary rationales, is transnational un-belonging.  
Finally, this approach draws attention to wider transnational relations of political economy 
and power in shaping the political discourse and framing of migration governance. Rationales 
of belonging justify selectivity and complex stratification (Carmel and Paul 2013) by 
strategically positioning the national state, welfare system and migration in a wider political 
economy context (also Paul 2013). In our empirical case, both sets of participants represented 
a commonly-understood national regulatory context in an EU framework. We can imagine 
that in other contexts, neo-colonial, dependency or partnership relations might be particularly 
salient. Both the importance, and the expression of relational positioning in our study 
constitutes a promising avenue for research.  
The conceptual ambiguity of ‘welfare chauvinism’ reflects and contributes to the continued 
political resonance of assumptions about the existence of ‘welfare magnets’, and ‘benefit 
tourism’ (Geiger, 2018; Greve 2019). These assumptions continue to exert their elusive, 
almost magical power over policymakers, politicians, and academics as a way of politically 
reasoning and regulating migrants and their rights, in a reductionist ‘policy imaginary’ 
(Mayblin 2016). Yet all available empirical evidence contradicts this argument, is ambiguous, 
or just poorly framed and conceptualised (Greve 2011; Carmel and Sojka 2018). We need 
better analytical tools to discriminate between racism, anti-immigrantism, xenophobia, 
labour-market and welfare-state protectionism. We think that the framework developed here 
should help to explain how these function together to shape the politics and governance of 
migrants rights in practice. 
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1 The interviews were conducted as part of the NORFACE-funded TRANSWEL project. This section of the project 
was led by Ann Runfors, and Florence Fröhlig at Södertörn University. We are grateful for their insights and 
inspiration in developing our analysis of the UK-Poland case, and the opportunity for collective reflection on the 
analysis with other TRANSWEL researchers. As explained below, the method of analysis for this article differs from 
that of the project (cf Runfors and Fröhlig 2019), but consideration of our interview findings draws on these 
discussions. 
2 The small size of this specialist and elite group, a number of whom (from different countries, as well as the same 
country) may work with one another, meant that protecting anomymity was potentially difficult. For this reason, 
we asked participants to identify a role description for themselves that we could use when citing them, that were 
confident would also protect their anonymity. The roles of participants published here are those chosen by 
participants.  
3 For the project, this article’s authors undertook critical discourse analysis and discourse logics to identify the 
logics that underpinned discourses on EU migration and welfare, to inform Runfors and Fröhlig’s comparative 
analysis across eight EU member states (2019). Our purpose differs: to conceptualise reasonings about the 
relationship between migration and welfare, by exploring their expression in a small case study.  
4 The Daily Mail is a British daily conservative tabloid newspaper, notorious for shaping political discourse and 
debate as politicians try to please its (notional) readers. 
5 This was also part of a campaign by the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and the UK from November 2013, to 
change the regulation on child benefit, which has continued to garner support among member states even during 
protracted Brexit negotiations.  
